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DIRECTOR DISMISSAL OF DERIVATIVE SUITS AFTER
ZAPATA CORP. v. MALDONADO
Corporate stockholders bring derivative suits on behalf of a corpora-
tion to enforce corporate rights.1 Derivative suits enable stockholders to
remedy or prevent injury to the corporation when directors fail to sue,
or wrongfully refuse to sue.2 Although the plaintiff stockholder names
the corporation as a nominal defendant, the corporation, and not the
' Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Meyer v. Fleming,
327 U.S. 161, 167 (1946); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litiga-
tion: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 96 n.1 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Dent]; Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Ac-
tions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168, 168 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Demand and Standing]. See
generally 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5939 (rev.
perm. ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970) (derivative suit is equitable remedy to
enforce corporate cause of action when directors will not); United Copper Sec. Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
331, 345 (1856) (first United States Supreme Court case recognizing derivative action). In'
United Copper, the Supreme Court stated the rationale of judicial reluctance to interfere
with directors' decisions. 244 U.S. at 263-64. Comparing a decision not to enforce a corporate
cause of action to any other business decision, the Court disdained judicial involvement in
intracorporate affairs unless the directors had breached their fiduciary duty to corporate
shareholders. Id. See generally Dent, supra note 1, at 96 n.1; Prunty, The Shareholders'
Derivative Suit. Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Prunty]. A corporation's shareholders may institute a derivative suit against corporate of-
ficers, directors, or any other party that allegedly has harmed the corporation. Ross v. Bern-
hard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970). See also notes 6-7 infra (procedural prerequisites for
derivative actions). The corporation keeps any recovery the shareholder earns because to
allow the shareholder to recover directly might defraud corporate creditors by enabling the
shareholder to convert corporate assets to personal assets regardless of the corporation's
solvency. See Prunty, supra, at 989; Note, Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative
Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1147 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Shareholder
Suits]. Suits alleging direct harm by the corporation or its employees do not come within
the recognized category of derivative suits even if brought by a shareholder. See Demand
and Standing, supra note 1, at 168 n.2. See generally, Shareholder Suits, supra. Because the
derivatively suing shareholder alternatively seeks to compel the corporation to sue or to en-
force the corporation's rights, courts and commentators perceive the derivative suit as a
dual cause of action. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (corporate claim and
derivative shareholder claim combined in derivative suit); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1251, 1261-62 (Del. Ch. 1980) (recognized dual aspect of shareholder derivative suit), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); cf. 13 FLET-
CHER, supra note 1, § 5946 (both aspects of derivative action essential to balance
corporation's and shareholders' interests); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in
Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 603 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Business Judgment Rule] (suit against corporate directors for refusal to sue and suit
against wrongdoer); Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a
Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748 (1960) (shareholder must establish claim that
directors wrongfully refused to sue before court will allow maintenance of action against
wrongdoer); Comment, Offensive Application of the Business Judgment Rule to Terminate
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stockholder, recovers any judgment from the derivative suit.' Because
minority shareholders allegedly have abused the power to sue
derivatively,4 courts and legislatures have created impediments to the
right to sue derivatively.' To institute a derivative suit, a shareholder
must meet demand and standing requirements.6 To meet the demand re-
quirement, the shareholder must demand that the corporation's direc-
tors sue on behalf of the corporation, or prove that demand would be
futile.7 A shareholder satisfies the demand requirement if after receiv-
Nonfrivolous Derivative Actions: Should the Courts Guard the Guards?, 12 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 635, 637 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Court Guards] (derivative action contains two
suits)..
13 FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5953, at 387; Prunty, supra note 2, at 989.
See Dent, supra note 1, at 137-40; Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116
U. PA. L. REV. 74, 75-77 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dykstra]; Demand and Standing, supra
note 1, at 168. Abuses may occur if a shareholder institutes a nuisance or "strike" suit solely
for a private settlement, or if an attorney brings a derivative action primarily to collect at-
torney's fees. See Dent, supra note 1, at 138 & nn.211-12; note 5 infra.
I See Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interests Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Direc-
tors in Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122, 1132 & nn.54-56 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Buxbaum] (citing authorities who evaluate validity of "strike suit" charges); Dent, supra
note 1, at 137-40 (requirement of court approval of settlements and discretion to assess costs
against plaintiff); Dykstra, supra note 4, at 75-82 (impediments include security for ex-
penses, contemporaneous ownership, and demands on directors and shareholders); Demand
and Standing, supra note 1, at 168 (impediments include requirement that shareholders ex-
haust intracorporate remedies); notes 6-7 and accompanying text infra. Because
shareholders may institute "strike suits," which are derivative suits brought solely for the
suits' settlement value to the particular stockholder, courts and legislatures have limited
the availability of derivative suits. See notes 6-7 infra. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
now require court approval to settle derivative suits, thereby virtually eliminating the
danger of strike suits. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; see Dent, supra note 1, at 138. Courts do not ap-
prove of settlements in strike suit situations, and instead require the plaintiff shareholder
to prove the merits of his case, if any, at trial. Dent, supra note 1, at 138.
6 See notes 7-9 and accompanying text infra. Some legislatures have enacted pro-
cedural barriers other than showing demand or standing. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (re-
quiring court approval of derivative suit settlements); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (Consol.
Supp. 1979) (requiring shareholder to post security for corporation's expenses); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 180.405 (West 1957) (ownership of shares contemporaneous with alleged wrong
necessary).
' See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1882) (original judicial creation of
demand requirement in American derivative suits); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; 13 FLETCHER, supra
note 1, §§ 5963, 5965. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 5; Note, A Procedural Treatment
of Derivative Suit Dismissals by Minority Directors, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 885 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Derivative Suits]; Demand and Standing, supra note 1. Besides acting
as a procedural limitation on shareholder derivative suits, the demand requirement is a con-
dition precedent to shareholder suits to enforce corporate rights that serves some construc-
tive purposes. See Demand and Standing, supra note 1, at 171-72. The demand requirement
prevents judicial interference in intracorporate disputes until the shareholder exhausts all
available intracorporate remedies. Id. at 171. In addition, the demand serves to notify the
corporation's directors of a remediable harm or right that the directors may have overlooked,
thereby allowing the directors the opportunity to enforce corporate rights. Id. The directors
normally supervise corporate litigation as part of their managerial function. Id.
Practical reasons favor allowing directors rather than shareholders to litigate a cor-
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ing the shareholder's demand, the directors refuse to sue or fail to act.'
To establish standing, a shareholder must show that the directors' inac-
tion or refusal constitutes a "wrongful refusal" not to sue.9
Directors may attempt to terminate a derivative suit by challenging
the shareholder's standing to sue derivatively. 0 If the shareholder fails
to show "wrongful refusal," the court will grant the directors' motion to
dismiss for lack of standing." Courts uniformly have granted directors'
porate cause of action. Id. First, directors generally have greater access to the facts
underlying the proposed suit. Id. Directors can better evaluate the business justifications
for and against pursuing the cause of action, both because of their business expertise and
fiduciary obligations to do so. Id. at 171-72. Finally, allowing the directors to pursue the
litigation themselves places the vast corporate assets behind the litigation. Id. at 172.
1 Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1262 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See generally Demand and
Standing, supra note 2, at 170-82.
' See 13 FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5969; Demand and Standing, supra note 1, at 193.
The standing requirement rests on the common-law doctrine that minority shareholders
may not maintain a suit on the corporation's behalf contrary to the directors' decision
because the directors manage the corporation's business affairs. See Demand and Standing,
supra note 1, at 169. A derivatively suing shareholder must demonstrate the wrongfulness
of the directors' decision not to sue in order to establish standing. Id. at 191. A shareholder
may prove wrongfulness, for example, by showing self-dealing, a board controlled by the
wrongdoer, or proving that the corporation has a clear cause of action. Id. at 193-98.
"o See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 474 (1979) (directors asserted that their deci-
sion not to sue was not wrongful because litigation was not in corporation's best interests);
Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979) (special litigation committee
maintained that continuation of suit would harm corporation), cer& denied, 444 U.S. 1017
(1980); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 684 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (directors urged that
pursuit of claim was detrimental to corporation); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495
F. Supp. 713, 715 (E.D. Va. 1980) (committee concluded that costs outweighed benefits of
lawsuit); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (litigation committee
urged dismissal because the shareholder's claim lacked merit, costs outweighed benefits,
litigation would waste management's time, and would generate adverse publicity);
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (decision to dismiss not wrongful
for reasons stated in Maher v. Zapata Corp.), rev'd per curiam, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982)
(remanded to allow trial court to determine whether in court's business judgment suit
would not benefit Zapata); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981) (same
reasons for dismissal as in Maher v. Zapata Corp.); note 23 infra (defining "special litigation
committee").
" See note 10 supra. Only a few courts deny the special litigation committee's right to
compel dismissal. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, 718 n.1 (E.D.
Va. 1980) (Virginia law does not permit directors to dismiss derivative actions); Maher v.
Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1980). Furthermore, if the Southern District
of Texas reheard Maher, the court might reach a different result because of the Delaware
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado. See note 50 infra.
" See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461-62 (1882) (derivative suit against city
seeking payment for water supplied dismissed because directors' decision not to charge city
was reasonable business judgment); Ash v. International Business Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491,
492-93 (3d Cir. 1965) (directors' refusal to sue competitor for possible antitrust violation
deemed proper), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F.
Supp. 577, 581-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (directors' avoidance of challenge to allegedly confiscatory
rate-making policy proper); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa
1982] 1205
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motions to dismiss for lack of standing when shareholders attempt to
sue unaffiliated third parties derivatively." Courts have reached conflict-
ing results, however, when presented with the question whether direc-
tors may terminate shareholder derivative actions alleging wrongs by
the directors themselves."3 Some courts have held that a director's finan-
cial or other interest in the outcome of the derivative suit precludes a ra-
tional decision by the director on whether to dismiss. 4 Consequently,
these courts have held that when a shareholder charges the majority of
the board with wrongdoing, the directors can never dismiss the action."
Most courts have reviewed the directors' decision to dismiss using the
business judgment rule, which precludes judicial scrutiny of directors'
actions unless the shareholder shows fraud, self-dealing, or unreason-
ableness in the decision. 6 Because of the difficulty of showing impropriety
in a director's motivation, 7 these courts generally have granted the
directors' motion to dismiss. 8 Thus, the issue remains whether directors
may terminate shareholder derivative suits brought against corporate
board members.' 9 Additionally, if courts allow director termination of at
least some derivative suits, a second issue arises concerning the proper
standard of review a court should apply before allowing termination."
In Burks v. Lasker," the United States Supreme Court tacitly sanc-
Per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592, 595-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (directors properly refused to bring suit for
alleged impropriety in third parties' stock purchases); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696,
699-700 (D. Del. 1966) (court deferred to directors' decision not to sue parent corporation for
alleged adhesion contract).
11 Compare Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (allowing direc-
tor dismissal), rev'd per curiam, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982), with Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490
F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (not permitting director dismissal).
" See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 395 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(director interest negated necessity of demand and precluded judicial deference to direc-
tors' business judgment that suit would not benefit corporation); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490
F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (court called the interested directors' decision not to sue
"unreasonable" implying directors' unfitness to make that decision).
15 See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, 718 (E.D. Va. 1980);
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
" See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 1980); Abbey v. Control Data
Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Genzer v. Cunn-
ingham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 687 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629-32,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000-01, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27 (1979); Arsht, The Business Judgment
Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. RaV. 93, 111-12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Arsht] (distilling
business judgment rule from early cases). See notes 85-90 and accompanying text infra.
1" See note 65 infra (structural bias may be unconscious and consequently difficult or
impossible for plaintiffs to prove).
1 See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 1980) (court remanded to determine
if dismissal was appropriate); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 689 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 636, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 930
(1979).
" See notes 60-76 and accompanying text infra.
" See notes 85-108 and accompanying text infra.
21 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
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tioned director termination of shareholder derivative suits brought
against board members. 22 In Burks, the Supreme Court determined
whether a special litigation committee' created by a corporation's board
to investigate the shareholder's allegation could terminate a derivative
suit against fellow directors. 4 The Burks special litigation committee
had full authority to investigate whether the shareholder's claim
See id. at 485.
Id. at 474. The procedure corporate directors use to terminate shareholder
derivative suits brought against board members centers around the special litigation com-
mittee. See generally Dent, supra note 1, at 608-15. Normally, a corporation confronted with
a derivative suit implicating its directors will create a committee composed of allegedly
disinterested and independent directors. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 474 (special
litigation committee composed of five board members who were neither defendants, direc-
tors at time of alleged wrong, nor affiliated with co-defendant, and were disinterested
within meaning of Investment Company Act of 1940); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 780
(9th Cir. 1980) (special litigation committee composed of two outside directors appointed to
board subsequent to allegedly illegal transactions plus one director named as defendant but
who allegedly did not receive any gain); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th
Cir. 1979) (special litigation committee was composed of seven outside non-defendant direc-
tors who allegedly had no knowledge of challenged transactions). The corporation next
delegates to the special litigation committee the power to investigate the stockholder's com-
plaint, and advise the corporation whether to pursue the alleged cause of action. In most
cases, the committee will advise the board of directors to oppose the suit. See Dent, supra
note 1, at 109. Different special litigation committees generally cite similar reasons for op-
posing the derivative suit. Id. The committee usually maintains that no genuine cause of ac-
tion exists, the corporation probably will not prevail, the litigation costs outweigh any
potential gain, the negative publicity will harm the corporation's business, and the action
will disrupt corporate affairs and reduce morale. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 56 (2d
Cir. 1980); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 686 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Gall v. Exxon
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 512-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 625-26,
393 N.E.2d 994, 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (1979).
24 441 U.S. at 473. The plaintiffs in Burks were two shareholders of Fundamental In-
vestors, Inc. (Fundamental), an' investment company incorporated in Delaware and
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the ICA). Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1
to 80a-52 (1976) (current version of ICA). The plaintiffs brought a derivative suit against An-
chor Corp., Fundamental's registered investment advisor under the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940 (the IAA), and certain former and present directors of Fundamental. 441 U.S. at
473; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976). Fundamental purchased $20,000,000 face amount
of Penn Central 270-day commercial notes on Anchor's recommendation. 441 U.S. at 473-74.
Penn Central filed for reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act seven months after
Fundamental purchased the notes. Id. at 474 n.3; see 11 U.S.C. § 77 (1976). Penn Central did
not meet the payments due on the notes at maturity. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1209
(2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). The plaintiffs' complaint alleged
that Fundamental purchased the Penn Central notes exclusively on the recommendation of
Goldman, Sachs & Co., and that neither Fundamental nor Anchor undertook an independent
investigation into Penn Central's financial condition. 441 U.S. at 473. The complaint charged
that by foregoing an independent inquiry into the quality of the Penn Central notes, Anchor
breached its responsibility as Fundamental's investment advisor. Id. Moreover, the plain-
tiffs alleged that Fundamental's directors knew of Anchor's failure to investigate and' failed
to object to the purchase, thereby breaching their fiduciary duties to Fundamental's
shareholders. Id. The complaint charged that Fundamental thus violated § 36 and § 13(a)(3)
of the ICA by not properly investigating Penn Central's financial condition before investing
120719821
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merited further action.25 Furthermore, the board only appointed to the
litigation committee disinterested directors who had no financial stake
in the outcome of the lawsuit.26 The Supreme Court held that disin-
terested directors could terminate a derivative suit in federal court pro-
vided the applicable state law allows termination," and that termination
of the suit does not frustrate federal policy.28 The two-pronged Burks
test requires a federal court to determine first whether directors have
the power to dismiss derivative suits against fellow directors.' When
the Supreme Court decided Burks, however, many state supreme courts
in Penn Central bonds, and by buying over 10% of Penn Centrars securities. Lasker v.
Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976) (as amended) (cause of action
exists for gross abuse of trust); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (1976) (by its registration statement
Fundamental could not hold more than 10% of any single issuer's securities). The complaint
further alleged that Anchor violated § 206 of the IAA. 404 F. Supp. at 1174; see 15 U.S.C. §
80b-6 (1976) (antifraud provision). Finally, the complaint alleged that because the fund's
directors failed to notice Penn Central's deteriorating condition, did not attempt to sell the
notes, and because Anchor failed to advise the fund to sell the notes, all defendants violated
their common-law fiduciary duty. 404 F. Supp. at 1175.
Fundamental created a five-man special litigation committee to investigate the
shareholders' complaint and advise the board what to do about the suit. 404 F. Supp. at
1175. None of the five directors was on Fundamental's board at the time of Fundamentars
purchase of Penn Central securities, or was named as a defendant. See Lasker v. Burks, 567
F.2d at 1209, 1210 n.5. Thus, the directors on the committee were disinterested within the
meaning of the ICA. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1976); Note, Director Dismissal of
Shareholder Derivative Suits Under the Investment Company Act: Burks v. Lasker, 11
Loy. CH. L. REV. 519, 528 n.52 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Director Dismissal]. The commit-
tee retained as special counsel former New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Stanley H.
Fuld, who presented three proposals to the committee. 404 F. Supp. at 1175. Judge Fuld ad-
vised the committee that they could move to dismiss, allow the suit to proceed, or attempt
to gain control of the suit. Id. Fundamental moved to dismiss the action based on the special
litigation committee's business judgment that the suit was not in Fundamentars best in-
terests. Id. at 1176; see Director Dismissal, supra, at 529 n.55. The Southern District of
New York initially held that it would not substitute the court's judgment for that of a truly
disinterested and independent board. 404 F. Supp. at 1180. The court, therefore, denied
without prejudice the directors' motion to dismiss and remanded the case to enable the
plaintiffs the opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue of the committee's
disinterestedness. Id. On rehearing, the court granted the directors' motion to dismiss. 426
F. Supp. at 852-53. The court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the burden of establishing
that the directors lacked independence, and consequently that the business judgment rule
shielded from judicial scrutiny the directors' decision to dismiss. Id.
441 U.S. at 474.
26 Id.
I See id. at 480. In a derivative suit against directors for breach of fiduciary duty, the
law of the state of corporate domicile applies. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 n.44
(1977); Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 629 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 309 (1971); see Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S.
518, 527-28 (1947) (court assumed that law of corporate domicile governed intracorporate af-
fairs).
See 441 U.S. at 480.
See id.
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had not addressed the issue whether directors had the power to dismiss
shareholder derivative suits brought against board members.
A series of three cases construing Delaware corporate law il-
lustrates the different results courts may reach when deciding whether
state law allows director dismissal of derivative suits and the proper
standard by which to review termination decisions." Maldonado v.
Flynn,31 Maher v. Zapata Corp., and Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado' arose
when shareholders of Zapata Corporation ,Zapata), a Delaware corpora-
tion, brought derivative suits against Zapata's directors in federal
district court in New York and Texas, and in Delaware state court.
Although Burks required federal courts to apply Delaware state law to
determine whether Zapata's directors had authority to dismiss the
derivative actions," the Delaware Supreme Court did not resolve the
issue until after the federal courts had considered the question. 5
In the first Zapata suit, Maldonado v. Flynn,"8 the plaintiff
shareholder charged Zapata's directors with violations of the proxy
disclosure standards of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act).3
The District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the
two-tiered Burks test to determine whether to dismiss the action after a
special litigation committee of disinterested Zapata directors recom-
mended termination. 8 In the absence of a Delaware court decision on the
See notes 36-52 and accompanying text infra.
3, Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (decided Jan. 24, 1980), rev'd
per curiam, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982).
, 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (decided May 27, 1980).
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (decided May 13, 1981).
, See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado (Madonado-Del.), 430 A.2d 779, 780-81 (Del. 1981)
(citing but not following two previously decided cases involving Maldonado-Del. facts); text
accompanying notes 47-52 infra. The plaintiff shareholders' complaints in all three Zapata
actions concerned the directors' amendment to Zapata's stock option plan. Maldonado v.
Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Del. Ch. 1980) (decided March 18, 1980), rev'd sub nom. Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Zapata planned a tender offer for some of its
outstanding stock while some of the options granted directors remained unexercisable. Id.
Zapata's directors realized that the offer would increase the market price for Zapata shares.
Id. Presumably wishing to limit the gain recognized on exercise of the options, the directors
accelerated the exercise date so that they could exercise their options before the tender of-
fer announcement. Id. This scheme enabled the directors to limit the gain they would
recognize on exercise, but also reduced the deduction Zapata could take against taxable in-
come. Id. The shareholders sued derivatively to recover the value of the pro forma tax
deduction to Zapata. Id. at 1255.
1 Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd per curiam, 671 F.2d 729
(2nd Cir. 1982).
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 277 (alleging violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976)
(regulating proxy statements)), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.
1982).
1 See id. at 278-82; text accompanying notes 27-28 supra (Burks test). Zapata's special
litigation committee consisted of two directors appointed to Zapata's board four years after
the board first received notice of Maldonado's complaint. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1982] 1209
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issue, 9 the district court relied on an Eighth Circuit opinion which had
construed Delaware law.4" The Eighth Circuit held that Delaware law
allowed director termination of derivative suits brought against direc-
tors.4 ' The Eighth Circuit applied the business judgment rule to review
the propriety of the directors' decision to dismiss." Following the Eighth
Circuit, the Southern District court held that under Delaware law,
courts should accord the utmost consideration to a special litigation com-
mittee's decision not to sue, and allowed -director termination of the
derivative suit.
43
1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980). The two outside directors had no direct interest in the Maldonado
suit because they were not board members at the time of the decision that Maldonado at-
tacked as improper. See id. The Southern District of New York investigated thoroughly the
plaintiffs allegation charging the special litigation committee with a lack of independence
but found no bias. See 485 F. Supp. at 282-84. The court found that the board delegated full
power to decide whether to dismiss the derivative suit to the litigation committee. Id. at
283. The two committee members had no significant contacts with board members before
their appointment to the board. Id. Even the fact that the defendant board picked the com-
mittee members did not sway the court's finding of independence. Id. at 283-84. But see note
54 infra (directors may favor those who appointed them).
" See Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd per curiam, 671
F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982). The Southern District of New York decided Maldonado v. Flynn
before the Delaware Chancery court decided whether directors could dismiss derivative
suits brought against directors under Delaware state law. Compare id. (decided Jan. 24,
1980), with Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980) (decided Mar. 18, 1980), rev'd
sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
40 485 F. Supp. at 278 (citing Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728-30 (8th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980)).
" See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
42 See id.
485 F. Supp. at 279, 286 (citing Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, __ ,160 A.2d 731,
738-39 (Ch. 1960) (courts accord the utmost consideration to disinterested directors' deci-
sions)).
The Southern District of New York first recognized that no Delaware court had ad-
dressed the issue whether directors had the power to dismiss derivative suits brought
against directors. 485 F. Supp. at 278. Without guidance from Delaware courts, the New
York federal court had to determine how the Delaware Supreme Court would decide the
issue. See id. at 278-80. The Maldonado v. Flynn court reasoned that because the business
judgment rule applied to directors' decisions about corporate litigation, and because
Delaware courts also applied the business judgment rule to evaluate corporate litigation
decisions, the business judgment rule applied in the instant situation. Id. at 279-80; see
United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 263-64 (1917) (business judg-
ment rule applies to litigation decisions); Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, -, 141 A.2d
458, 461 (Ch. 1958) (Delaware courts apply business judgment rule to evaluate litigation
decisions).
The Second Circuit reversed the Southern District of New York on the latter court's
holding that the business judgment rule allowed director termination of shareholder
derivative suits brought against directors in all situations. Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d
729, 732 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (director termination appropriate only if directors act in-
dependently, in good faith, and if court independently decides that dismissal would benefit
corporation). Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule applies to dismissal decisions
only if the situation required the shareholders to demand that the directors institute suit on
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Soon after the Southern District of New York decided Maldonado v.
Flynn, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas decided
Maher v. Zapata Corp." In Maher, the plaintiff alleged not only the '34
Act proxy violation charged in Maldonado v. Flynn, but also alleged
violations of the Texas Business Corporation Act and breach of common-
law fiduciary duties. 5 Although the Maker court found that Zapata
directors conducted a thorough, disinterested investigation, the court
refused to grant the directors' motion for summary judgment. The court
held that under Delaware law the business judgment rule did not give
directors the power to dismiss derivative suits against directors.4 8 Thus,
two federal courts reached opposite conclusions regarding whether
Delaware law allowed director termination of derivative suits brought
against fellow board members.
In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado (Maldonado-Del47 the third case in
the Zapata series, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the issue of
director termination of derivative suits brought against board
members. 8 The Maldonado-Del. court held that a special litigation com-
mittee had the power to terminate shareholder derivative suits under
Delaware corporate law, 9 although a committee had no power to dismiss
under the judicially created business judgment rule. 0 The Delaware
behalf of the corporation. See id. at 731; note 51 infra. If a court determines that demand on
the directors would be futile and therefore exempts the shareholder from the demand re-
quirement, then the court must review the directors' motion to dismiss using strict judicial
scrutiny. See id.; note 7 and accompanying text supra; notes 51-59 and accompanying text
infra.
4 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
'1 Id. at 349-50 (plaintiff shareholder alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2),
78n (1976 & Supp. II 1979) (require certain proxy statement disclosures), violation of TEx.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02A(6) (Vernon 1980) (prohibits intracorporate loans to directors
and officers), and breach of common-law fiduciary duties).
" Id. at 352-53. The Southern District of Texas court predicted that the Delaware
Supreme Court would affirm Maldonado v. Flynn. Id. at 353. But see Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (reversing Maldonado v. Flynn). In Maher v. Zapata
Corp. the court correctly concluded that the business judgment rule did not give directors
the power to dismiss shareholder derivative suits. 490 F. Supp. at 353; see Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781-82 (Del. 1981). The business judgment rule does not grant
directors any powers, which arise by statute or charter, but operates only to create a
presumption of propriety in certain circumstances about a director's decision. 430 A.2d at
782; see Arsht, supra note 16, at 111-12 (detailing circumstances necessary to invoke
business judgment rule); notes 85-90 and accompanying text infra. The Maher court
overlooked Delaware corporate law, which did enable directors to dismiss derivative suits.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782, 785 (Del. 1981) (directors may dismiss
detrimental litigation under Delaware law).
', 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
"Id. at 781.
' Id. at 782 (construing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974 rev.)).
Id. at 782; see text accompanying notes 85-90 infra. Because the Delaware Supreme
Court held that directors had the power to dismiss shareholder derivative suits, the
Southern District of Texas would have to reverse itself on that issue if it reheard Maher v.
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Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule applied as a stand-
ard of review to disinterested board decisions, serving to insulate those
decisions from strict judicial review. 1 The Maldonado-Del. court held
that the business judgment rule did not apply to Zapata's special litiga-
tion committee's decision to dismiss because a disinterested board did
not make the decision.2 Because the Maldonado-Del. court found that
directors could terminate suits brought against directors under
Delaware corporate law, the court had to determine the proper standard
of review.5
Balancing the directors' and shareholders' competing interests, the
Delaware Supreme Court called for strict judicial review of the commit-
tee's decision to recommend dismissal whenever an interested majority
of the board of directors appoints a disinterested special litigation com-
mittee. 4 After Maldonado-Del., directors face a two step test before a
Zapata Corp. In Maher, the absence at the time of a Delaware Supreme Court decision on
whether directors had the power to dismiss derivative suits against fellow directors left the
Texas court free to speculate on that issue. See Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348,
351 (S.D. Tex. 1980). The Texas court erroneously predicted that the Delaware Supreme
Court would prohibit disinterested director termination of derivative suits implicating
fellow directors. Id. at 353. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado forces federal courts presented with
a director's motion to dismiss to recognize that under Delaware law, directors have a limited
power to terminate shareholder derivative suits. See 430 A.2d at 782.
" 430 A.2d at 782. But see text accompanying notes 101-08 infra (court called for strict
judicial review and did not apply traditional business judgment rule).
The Delaware Supreme Court distinguished between instances calling for demand on
directors and situations when a court validly excuses demand because of its futility. 430
A.2d at 784 & n.10. When shareholders attack a board's refusal to bring suit against the
alleged wrongdoer, the Maldonado-Del. strict judicial scrutiny test does not apply. Id.; see
text accompanying notes 55-59 infra (strict judicial scrutiny test). See also Maldonado v.
Flynn, 671 F.2d 729, 731 (2d Cir. 1982) (Maldonado-Del. makes sharp distinction between de-
mand and no demand cases). Only when demand would be futile and the shareholder actually
does .not make a demand does the Maldonado-Del. strict judicial scrutiny standard of review
apply. See 430 A.2d at 787-88. Under Maldonado-Del. the strict standard of review applies
only where shareholders "properly commenced" the derivative suit. Id. at 788. The
Delaware Supreme Court held that if the shareholder instituted suit after making demand
and receiving a refusal, the shareholder would not have "properly commenced" the litiga-
tion. See id. at 787 (case properly initiated because demand was futile). The validity and
value of the Maldonado-Del. court's distinction between board refusal cases and demand ex-
cused cases is suspect. See text accompanying notes 91-96 infra (courts should never apply
business judgment rule to review directors' motions to dismiss derivative suits brought
against directors).
52 430 A.2d at 787; see note 51 supra.
' 430 A.2d at 788-89; see text accompanying notes 101-08 infra. The Maldonado-Del.
strict standard of review applies only when a court excuses a derivatively suing
shareholder's failure to demand of the directors that the directors institute suit. See note
51 supra.
" 430 A. 2d at 788-89. The Delaware Supreme Court recognized that a special litiga-
tion committee appointed by a defendant majority of the board might have a predisposition
to recommend dismissal. Id. at 787; accord, Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 354
(S.D. Tex. 1980). Commentators label the tendency of directors to recommend dismissal of
derivative suits against fellow directors as "structural bias." See Business Judgment Rule,
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Delaware court will grant a motion to dismiss. First, the reviewing
Delaware court s' must find that the litigation committee acted in-
dependently and in good faith, and conducted a reasonable investigation
of the shareholder's allegation." After the complaining shareholder
proves that demand was futile, the Maldonado-Del. test shifts the
burden of persuasion to the directors, denying them the business judg-
ment rule's presumption of propriety.5 7 Second, the court must make an
independent inquiry whether the derivative suit is in the corporation's
best interests instead of blindly relying on the committee's judgment.5
If the special litigation committee's dismissal recommendation fails to
meet either part of the test, the court will not grant the directors' mo-
tion to dismiss. 9
The Maldonado-Del. court balanced the legitimate and competing in-
terests of the directors and shareholders to determine whether directors
may dismiss derivative suits brought against directors and what stand-
ard of review applies to directors' motions to dismiss." Several reasons
supra note 2, at 619-25. See also Dent, supra note 1, at 110-17; Steinberg, The Use of Special
Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,
24 & n.117 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg]; Derivative Suits, supra note 2, at 602,
619-26; Note, Mutual Fund Independent Directors: Putting a Leash on the Watchdogs, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 568, 580-81 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Independent Directors]; Note, The
Business Judgment Rule and the Litigation Committee: The End of a Clear Trend in Cor-
porate Law, 14 IND. L. REV. 617, 636-37 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Clear Trend]; Director
Dismissal, supra note 24, at 537 n.112, 538; Court Guards, supra note 2, at 658. Four factors
contribute to "structural bias." Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 619-22. These fac-
tors are selection for predisposition, threats against the director, economic self-interest, and
other personal interests. Id. First, the chief executive officer effectively selects new direc-
tors to the board, and the interested majority implicated by the derivative suit appoints
disinterested directors to the special litigation committee. Id. at 619, 622. Both of these
situations present opportunities to create a committee fundamentally opposed to recommend-
ing any suit against directors. Id. Second, once selected, committee members face implied
threats of dismissal, loss of friendship, and revenge for failure to dismiss. Id. at 620-21.
Third, board salaries and other financial ties to the corporation and its executives may im-
pair a committee member's judgment. Id. Finally, committee members may view their direc-
torships as status symbols requiring preservation, or may feel compassion for fellow direc-
tors facing a possibly enormous adverse judgment. Id. at 620, 622. One commentator claims
that over 90% of the directors of the 200 largest industrial corporations have personal ties
to each other and the chief executive officer, even though the majority are outside direc-
tors. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE
CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS, 127-31 (1976).
" See note 27 supra (Delaware law applies to shareholder derivative suits brought
against directors if corporate domicile is Delaware).
430 A.2d at 788.
' See id.
See id. at 789.
59 Id.
' See id. at 786-88. The Delaware Supreme Court sought a test that would enable the
corporation to avoid detrimental litigation, but would not give directors absolute discretion
over derivative suits. Id. The court's compromise should please commentators who criticized
previous decisions because the courts incorrectly had favored either the corporation or the
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favor authorizing directors to dismiss shareholder suits instituted
against fellow board members. First, directors can best determine the
economic merits of the lawsuit.2 Second, directors have better access
than shareholders to information inside the corporation concerning the
shareholder's allegations.2 Third, the directors can conduct a more
thorough investigation with less disruptive effect than shareholder
discovery.13 Finally, allowing director dismissal guards against
shareholder abuses of derivative suits for personal gain.1
4
Some commentators argue against allowing directors to dismiss
derivative suits implicating corporate directors because a special litiga-
tion committee may have a predisposition to recommend dismissal.'5 The
Maldonado-Del. test compensates for this inherent bias by requiring an
independent judicial balancing of the benefits of going forward with the
litigation and the benefits of dismissal.6 Only if a court finds adequate
and reasonable reasons supporting a motion to dismiss will the court ter-
minate a derivative suit.
minority shareholder. See Dent, supra note 1, at 118-19; Steinberg, Maldonado in Delaware:
Special Litigation Committees-An Unsafe Haven, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 381, 388-89 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Steinberg, Unsafe Haven]; Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at
632.
6 See Demand and Standing, supra note 1, at 171-72. Directors consider the economic
merits of a claim by weighing the potential recovery against the costs of that recovery. See
Court Guards, supra note 2, at 653. Besides court costs and attorney fees, corporations may
incur opportunity costs for lost management time, disruption of production activities,
damaged public image, reduced morale, and lost goodwill. See id. at 654. The directors are
best suited to make business decisions, but should not be the final arbiter of the legal
merits of claims. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 789 n.18. "[C]ourts and not
litigants should decide the [legal] merits of litigation." Id. (citing Maldonado v. Flynn, 413
A.2d at 1263).
Besides having the business expertise to evaluate the expected net return of corporate
litigation, directors have other practical advantages over shareholders in redressing cor-
porate wrongs, including efficiency in handling corporate litigation and access to the cor-
poration's generally greater financial, legal, and business resources. See Brooks v.
American Export Indus., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Abrams v. Mayfloiver In-
vestors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Tasner v. Billera, 379 F. Supp. 815, 826 (N.D.
Ill. 1974); Demand and Standing, supra note 1, at 171-72. Directors also have greater incen-
tives than shareholders to redress corporate wrongs. Directors have a fiduciary obligation
to the corporation not to waste corporate assets, including corporate claims. See Tasner v.
Billera, 379 F. Supp. 815, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Directors have a substantial indirect financial
interest in pursuing claims with a probable positive net recovery. Id. Shareholders have a
much more indirect and substantially smaller motivation because they personally do not
recover any damages. See id.
62 See Clear Trend, supra note 54, at 643; Demand and Standing, supra note 1, at
171-72.
' See Clear Trend, supra note 54, at 643; Demand and Standing, supra note 1, at
171-72.
" See text accompanying note 5 supra (allowing dismissal would reduce incidence of
strike suits).
5 See Derivative Suits, supra note 7, at 886-87; Court Guards, supra note 2, at 656-59;
note 54 supra (defining structural bias).
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
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A second drawback to allowing director dismissal is that the commit-
tee does not have judicial sanctions to force employees to cooperate with
an investigation." Board sanctions provide a workable substitute,
however, and can ensure that the special litigation committee has the
power to obtain complete assistance from corporate employees. 8 The
Maldonado-Del. test diminishes the problem of incomplete or cursory
committee investigations by granting the minority shareholder limited
discovery to uncover the unreasonableness of the committee investiga-
tion." The trial court will refuse to grant the directors' motion to dismiss
if the court finds that the committee did not investigate the
shareholder's allegations adequately."0 Moreover, under the Maldonado-
Del. strict judicial scrutiny standard of review, the court may deny the
directors' motion for any reason relating to the adequacy of the commit-
tee's investigation."' Furthermore, the court will allow the derivative
suit to proceed to trial if continuation would benefit the corporation,
regardless of the adequacy and reasonableness of the directors' in-
vestigation. 2
Finally, the possibility exists that the defendant board majority will
overrule or abolish the committee if the committee recommends con-
tinuation of the derivative action."3 This possibility calls for judicial
scrutiny of the majority's bad faith but should not absolutely prevent
disinterested minority directors from terminating shareholder
derivative suits not in the corporation's best interests. 4 Neither
, See Derivative Suits, supra note 7, at 900.
See id. at 894, 900. Although board sanctions could compel low-level employees to
cooperate with the litigation committee's investigation, those sanctions would not alleviate
the committee's lack of judicial sanctions against directors. See id. at 900.
" See 430 A.2d at 788 & n.16.
,o See id. at 788-89.
" See id. at 789.
7 See id.
71 See Dent, supra note 1, at 119-20. But see Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1315 (D.
Conn. 1981). In Joy, the special litigation committee appointed to investigate a shareholder's
allegations of breach of fiduciary duties and violations of the National Banks Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 21-215b (1976), decided not to recommend dismissal of some claims. 519 F. Supp. at 1315.
The interested majority of the board did not move to withdraw the committee's authority,
but accepted the committee's recommendation to institute suit against seven directors. See
519 F. Supp. at 1315. Thus, in certain instances directors act with the corporation's interests
in mind even when structural bias and self-interest might tempt them to act otherwise. See
id.
7" See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 788-89. See generally Dent, supra note
1, at 119-20. See also Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court re-
jected plaintiff's claim that because board could disband committee, committee had no
authority to seek dismissal). In deciding whether to dismiss a derivative suit, the ultimate
question must be whether the derivative suit is in the corporation's best interests. See note
109 infra. Under Maldonado-Del., the corporation's board or a special litigation committee
makes the decision, subject to judicial review. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
,5 See 430 A.2d at 785; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974 rev.) (enabling shareholders
to enact charter provision giving directors power to create special committees, but remain-
ing silent on directors' ability to disband those committees).
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Maldonado-Del. nor Delaware corporate law addresses the possibility of
board annulment of special litigation committees.75 If the directors at-
tempt to disband a special litigation committee about to decide whether
to pursue the complainant shareholder's claim, the court should prohibit
director termination of the lawsuit.
7
The Maldonado-Del. director dismissal test employs strict judicial
scrutiny to remedy a special litigation committee's inherent bias, and the
reviewing court's power to require a trial compensates for a committee's
lack of judicial sanctions to compel testimony." Furthermore, courts may
include an automatic trial provision to control defendant board ma-
jorities that abolish unfavorable litigation committees.78 Finally, the
Maldonado-Del. test avoids the extremes of always granting directors'
motions to dismiss79 or of always allowing derivative suits against direc-
tors to proceed to trial on the merits. 0 For these reasons, courts should
allow directors to dismiss derivative suits but should apply Maldonado-
Del. strict judicial scrutiny to review the directors' motions to dismiss.
The Maldonado-Del. court desired to ensure that derivative suits,
even if meritorious, do not cost the corporation more than the expected
recovery. 1 Conversely, the court sought to allow all beneficial derivative
actions to proceed to trial.2 To satisfy both desires, the Maldonado-Del.
court fashioned a strict judicial scrutiny standard to review motions to
dismiss." Strict judicial scrutiny represents a marked departure from
past judicial involvement in the corporate decision-making process. 4
Before Maldonado-Del., some courts adopted the business judgment
rule as the applicable standard of review of director decisions to seek
dismissal of shareholder derivative suits." The business judgment rule
"' Cf. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Gall court assumed
that the board had no statutory authority to disband a special litigation committee. Id. If
faced with an attempted disbandment, the Gall court presumably would allow the
derivative suit to proceed. See id.
See text accompanying notes 65-72 supra.
7' See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
7' See 430 A.2d at 788; cases cited at note 14 supra ; note 60 supra.
'o See 430 A.2d at 788; cases cited at note 16 supra ; note 60 supra.
81 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-87 (Del. 1981).
See id. at 789.
See id. at 788-89; text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
" See Arsht, supra note 16, at 95 & n.10. To foster judicial economy, courts traditionally
have avoided reviewing directors' decisions. See, e.g., Karasik v. Pacific E. Corp., 21 Del.
Ch. 81, 97, 180 A. 604, 611 (Ch. 1935) (honest mistake does not justify judicial interference);
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 A. 654, 659 (Ch. 1928) (not
court's function to resolve questions of business management or policy); Greenbaum v.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 27 A.D.2d 225, 231-32, 278 N.Y.S.2d 123, 130-31 (App. Div.
1967) (matters depending upon business judgment are not actionable). See generally Arsht,
supra note 16, at 95-100.
0 See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (court applied
business judgment rule under California law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey v.
Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1979) (court applied business judgment rule
[Vol. 39:1203
ZAPATA CORP. v. MALDONADO
raises a presumption of propriety about directors' decisions and shields
those decisions from judicial review.8 Although the shareholder's claim
concerns the appropriateness of a director decision made before the
creation of a special litigation committee, 7 most courts consider only the
appropriateness of the committee's decision to move to dismiss.88 Conse-
quently, under the business judgment rule if the plaintiff stockholder
fails to prove either self-dealing or other personal interest, lack of due
care, unreasonableness, or lack of good faith, the court will grant the
directors' motion to dismiss.89 If the shareholder proves one of these
elements, thereby rebutting the business judgment rule's presumption
of propriety, courts refuse to dismiss and therefore proceed to trial on
the merits."
Courts should not review directors' motions to dismiss derivative
under Delaware law), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp.
274, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dismissal proper under Delaware business judgment rule), rev'd
per curiam, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-34, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000-02, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-28 (1979) (application of business judgment rule to
director dismissal cases proper in New York). Abbey v. Control Data Corp. illustrates the
general approach of pre-Maldonado-Del. cases applying the business judgment rule to
review directors' motions to dismiss derivative suits brought against directorg. See 603
F.2d at 730-32. In Abbey, plaintiff-shareholder Abbey alleged corporate waste and
mismanagement for making illegal foreign payments. Id. at 726-27. Abbey discovered the
violations after Control Data Corp.'s (Control Data) guilty plea in an earlier criminal pro-
ceeding. Id. at 726. Control Data's board responded to the suit by creating a special litiga-
tion committee to investigate Abbey's charges and to determine whether to pursue the
claims against the implicated directors. Id. at 727. The committee recommended dismissal
because further litigation was not in the corporation's best interests. Id. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's finding that under the Delaware business judgment rule a court
may not substitute its views for those of a disinterested board made in good faith. Id. at 730.
The Eighth Circuit then determined that allowing dismissal was consistent with the second
part of the Burks test because the dismissal would not frustrate federal policy. Id. at 731-32.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's determination that the special litigation
committee properly dismissed the derivative action. See id. at 732.
" See Arsht, supra note 16, at 111-12. Contrary to some courts' beliefs, the business
judgment rule does not give directors the power to dismiss. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d at 782; see text accompanying notes 51-52 supra (business judgment rule is a standard
of review, not a power).
I See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 780 (shareholder alleged impropriety in
board's original decision and did not attack special litigation committee's later decision to
dismiss).
" See id. at 785-89; cases cited at note 16 supra. But see Abella v. Universal Leaf
Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, 717 (1980). The Abella court held that the committee's decis-
ion to seek dismissal was irrelevant to the issue of the propriety of the board's original
decision because the plaintiff challenged only the original decision. Id. The Abella court in
effect held that whenever demand on the directors is excused, the directors cannot dismiss
the derivative suit without litigating the merits of the shareholder's claim. Id. at 717-18.
Abella offers no safeguard against detrimental litigation, unlike Maldonado-Del. See 430
A.2d at 789 (court recognized need to prevent or stop detrimental litigation).
' See Arsht, supra note 16, at 112.
,o See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 788-89; cases cited at note 16 supra.
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suits brought against directors under the business judgment rule. 1 Nor-
mally plaintiff shareholders may shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant directors by establishing that those directors had a personal
interest that conflicted with the corporation's interests in the decision at
issue. 2 Because shareholders rarely can prove the presence of structural
bias, courts generally apply the business judgment rule to review an "in-
dependent" litigation committee's motion to dismiss. 3 Most courts ac-
cept the "disinterested" directors' judgment that the litigation would
not benefit the corporation without any inquiry into the directors' basis
for that belief. 4 Consequently, most courts grant the directors' motion to
dismiss. 5 The possibility of structural bias warrants a stricter standard
of review than the business judgment rule if derivative suits are to con-
tinue as "the chief regulator of corporate management."9 6
If a shareholder proves that a director had an interest in a decision
" See Derivative Suits, supra note 7, at 886-87; Business Judgment Rule, supra note
2, at 631; cf. Dent, supra note 1, at 110. One commentator advocates separate and distinct
treatments for derivative suits against third parties, against a minority of the board, and
against a majority of the board. Dent, supra note 1, at 110. Courts only would apply the
business judgment rule to review directors' decisions to dismiss derivative suits brought
against third parties. Id. Directors could never dismiss complaints brought against a board
majority. Id. The proposal calls for judicial scrutiny into the reasons for dismissal of
derivative suits brought against a board minority. Id.
Although the directors and not courts or shareholders run the corporation's business
affairs, including corporate litigation, courts will interfere in corporate affairs when equity
demands judicial involvement. See Arsht, supra note 16, at 109-11.
92 See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-23 (Del. 1971) (defendant directors
controlled Sinclair and subsidiary that dealt with Sinclair); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co.,
267 A.2d 883, 886-87 (Del. 1970) (parent-subsidiary self-dealing); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co.,
419 A.2d 952, 956-59 (Del. Ch. 1980) (management fee collected from partially owned sub-
sidiary); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 386-87 (Del. Ch. 1979) (ma-
jority shareholder on both sides of freezeout merger); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Summa
Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 13-14 (Del. Ch. 1977) (parent-subsidiary transaction involving interlocking
directorates); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188, 192 (Del. Ch. 1971) (controlling shareholder
dealing with corporation). Federal courts, applying Delaware law, also use the intrinsic
fairness test to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629
F.2d 287, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Harriman v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 151-53 (D. Del. 1975).
"' See Dent, supra note 1, at 115 (structural bias is very difficult to prove); cf. Business
Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 625 (shareholders usually cannot prove director self-
interest when corporation uses independent special litigation committee); Clear Trend,
supra note 54, at 636 & n.154 (showing committee nonindependence is an onerous task).
" See note 85 supra (courts generally defer to directors' judgment without inquiry).
" See note 85 supra; Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An
Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 262 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Coffee] (business judgment rule gives directors veto power over
derivative suits); Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 600, 602 (business judgment rule
immunizes decisions to terminate by barring judicial scrutiny); Clear Trend, supra note 54,
at 643-44 (business judgment rule unfairly shields directors).
1 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); see note 54 supra
(structural bias defined).
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adverse to the corporation, a Delaware court will apply the intrinsic
fairness test, a strict standard of review of the director's decision. 7
Under the intrinsic fairness test, the director implicated by the
derivative suit may escape liability by proving the fairness of the trans-
action to the corporation. 8 Courts applying the intrinsic fairness test
strictly scrutinize the results of the director's decision. If the director
meets the difficult burden of establishing the questioned decision's in-
trinsic fairness, the court will absolve the director of liability for the
decision's negative results.'
The Maldonado-Del. standard of review combines elements of the
business judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness test. 1 The Maldonado-
Del. test adopts the procedural prerequisites of the business judgment
rule, requiring an independent, good faith director dismissal decision
based on a reasonable investigation of the plaintiff shareholder's allega-
" See cases cited at note 92 supra. The intrinsic fairness test represents judicial
recognition that individual benefit and not corporate interests will govern decisions by
directors on both sides of a transaction. See Arsht, supra note 16, at 115. Application of the
intrinsic fairness test negates the business judgment rule's presumption of propriety and
substitutes a presumption of impropriety which the director must overcome to avoid liability.
Id. at 115-16.
93 See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977); Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 386 (Del Ch. 1979). The intrinsic fairness test shifts the
burden of persuasion from complaining shareholder to defendant director. See Arsht, supra
note 16, at 116. While the business judgment rule considers the reasonableness of corporate
decisions as of the time the decisions are made, the intrinsic fairness test considers only the
resulting fairness to the corporation. Id.
See notes 92 & 98 supra.
1" See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1974 rev.) (director not liable for negative results
of transaction which was fair in court's judgment).
"' See 430 A.2d at 788-89; text accompanying notes 102-08 infra. Courts should apply
the Maldonado-Del. test only with the Delaware Supreme Court's strict standard of review.
See 430 A.2d at 788-89. Misinterpretation of the Maldonado-Del. holding could seriously im-
pair the value of derivative suits in policing intracorporate affairs because review under the
business judgment rule invariably results in termination of the litigation. See Coffee, supra
note 95, at 262 (derivative suits threatened by judicial trend to allow director dismissal);
Dent, supra note 1, at 109 (special litigation committee cases may presage demise of
derivative suits); Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 602 (continued existence of
derivative suits as check on intracorporate abuses threatened by application of business
judgment rule to dismiss suits implicating majority of board); Clear Trend, supra note 54, at
645 (allowing director dismissal of derivative suits effectively denies shareholder remedies
for certain intracorporate wrongs); Court Guards, supra note 2, at 635 (increased use of
special litigation committees erodes effectiveness of derivative actions). But see Nussbacher
v. Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.), 444 F. Supp. 973, 977, 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (motion to
dismiss under business judgment rule denied where director interest in derivative suit pre-
sent). Other courts mistakenly may regard Maldonado-Del. as an indication that
disinterested directors may conclusively terminate derivative suits against fellow directors.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 782, 788-89 (modifying standard of review of
director termination of derivative suits). But see Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune,
525 F. Supp. 1311, 1325-26.(S.D. Iowa 1981) (adopted Maldonado-Del. strict scrutiny test);
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tions.'0 ' The court shifted the burden of persuasion on the prerequisites,
however, from the plaintiff to the directors who move to dismiss.08 The
intrinsic fairness test likewise allocates the burden of persuasion to the
defendants."4 The Maldonado-Del. court also called for strict judicial
scrutiny of the reasons for the directors' motion to dismiss."5 A
disinterested director's decision to recommend dismissal merely
represents his business judgment that prosecuting the derivative suit
would result in a negative net return to the corporation. 6 Ordinarily,
courts review disinterested director decisions under the business judg-
ment rule."07 Recognizing the possibility of structural bias, however, the
Maldonado-Del. court required the strict judicial review reserved for in-
stances of self-dealing under the intrinsic fairness test.00
Because the Maldonado-Del. court's fundamental concern centered
on the costs of litigation in comparison with the expected recovery of the
derivative suit,l"9 the court should have recognized the secondary nature
Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 665, 670 n.13 (1981) (recognized
Maldonado-Del. test called for strict scrutiny). Although Maldonado-Del. requires federal
courts applying Delaware law to recognize that directors may dismiss derivative suits, the
federal court need not adopt the Maldonado-Del. standard of review. See Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (federal procedural rules apply in federal court). If a federal court
allowed director dismissal under Maldonado-Del. but accorded the decision to dismiss the
traditional deference given under the business judgment rule, the consequent decision
possibly would signal the death knell of shareholder derivative suits. See Coffee, supra note
95, at 262 (call for legislative reform to keep derivative suit remedy viable). Maldonado-Del.
suggests the means to prevent strict judicial scrutiny and thereby allow directors to shield
themselves from liability for self-dealing. See 430 A.2d at 781 (i.e., by appointing
disinterested directors to investigate "thoroughly" all derivative suit charges). Even if the
derivative suit implicated all board members, if the corporate charter allows the directors
to appoint new members to the board, the board could form a special litigation committee
composed solely of the new directors, and wait for the anticipated recommendation to
dismiss. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 278, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd per
curiam, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); note 54 supra (structural bias would probably assure
recommendation to dismiss from special litigation committee). The Delaware Supreme
Court adopted a strict judicial scrutiny test solely because of the danger of structural bias
in derivative suits brought against a board majority. See 430 A.2d at 787.
102 See 430 A.2d at 788-89 (standard of review in derivative suits brought against board
majority).
103 Id.
' See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
,01 430 A.2d at 789.
1 See Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
Il See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra.
108 430 A.2d at 788-89; see notes 101-05 supra. Maldonado-Del. does not apply in any
case when the court does not excuse the demand on directors requirement. 430 A.2d at 784
& n.10; see note 51 supra.
'" 430 A.2d at 785, 789; accord, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979); Cramer v.
General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978); Dent, supra note 1, at 142-44
(ultimate issue is corporation's interests but costs rarely exceed probable recovery);
Derivative Suits, supra note 7, at 906; Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 626-27;
Court Guards, supra note 2, at 654-55; Demand and Standing, supra note 1, at 168, 196.
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of the impartiality of directors seeking to dismiss derivative actions.10 If
a court requires a derivative suit to proceed to trial because of director
interest in the outcome, without first considering whether continuation
of the suit will further corporate interests, the court has disregarded the
policy behind the Maldonado-Del. test of dismissing meritorious but
detrimental litigation.1 ' The Delaware Supreme Court recognized that
the ultimate question in derivative suits is whether the litigation fur-
thers the corporation's best interests."' Courts should dismiss even
meritorious derivative claims whenever the litigation costs outweigh the
benefits that the corporation may gain by further pursuit of the claim'
and whenever the shareholder has available a more economical means to
redress the alleged wrong.1 4 Although acknowledging the validity of
this tenet,1 5 the Maldonado-Del. court fashioned a test that precludes
dismissal of suits not in the corporation's best interests if interested
directors seek a dismissal."' The mere finding of director interest.in the
suit should not necessitate trial on the merits, because the trial could un-
duly burden the corporation's operations and financial resources.'17
,,I See Dent, supra note 1, at 123.
X See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 787-88 (court balanced shareholders'
desire to litigate and corporation's interest in avoiding detrimental litigation).
II See id. at 788.
,' See cases cited at note 109 supra. If the directors pursued a claim not in the corpora-
tion's best interests, even if the claim had clear social or political value, the shareholders
successfully could maintain an action for breach of fiduciary duty. See Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 204 Mich. 459,_, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (business corporation organized primarily
for profits may not operate for noneconomic although altruistic reasons). But see Steinberg,
Unsafe Haven, supra note 60, at 388 (considerations encompass shareholder welfare, public
policy, and corporate accountability).
"' See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1243 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd, 603
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980). Remedies possibly more
economical than derivative suits include compelling director compliance or voting non-
complying directors out of office, pursuing a private cause of action, or bringing criminal
charges against the wrongdoers. See Court Guards, supra note 2, at 655.
I I See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 784-85 (court should dismiss suits
detrimental to corporate interests or if corporation's rights otherwise are protected).
"I Id. at 788-89. Under the first part of the Maldonado-DOl. court's test, if the court
finds that the special litigation committee lacked independence, acted in bad faith, or con-
ducted an unreasonably shallow investigation, the reviewing court must deny the directors'
motion to dismiss. Id. The special litigation committee's superficial investigation or bad
faith should disqualify their recommendation to dismiss the derivative suit. Id. If the com-
mittee lacks the initiative properly to inquire into the shareholder's charge, the court
should not bear the responsibility of investigating sua sponte the validity of the allegation.
Mere interest in the transaction, however, should not preclude a director from participating
in the dismissal decision. See text accompanying notes 106-11 supra.
" Cf. 430 A.2d at 784 (citing McKee v. Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, -, 156 A. 191, 193
(Ch. 1931)) (interested directors are not proper persons to conduct litigation); Demand and
Standing, supra note 1, at 174-76 & n.60 (unreasonable to expect directors to sue
themselves). Interested directors probably would not sue themselves wholeheartedly. For-
bidding director dismissal of shareholder derivative suits on that basis makes a possibly un-
warranted assumption, however, that the directors should be sued.
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Attempted dismissal of derivative suits by interested directors
presents many of the same considerations present in self-dealing direc-
tor situations.'18 Both situations present potentially improper motiva-
tions in decisions purportedly made in the corporation's best interests."9
The Delaware Interested Directors Statute' specifically provides that
self-dealing transactions are neither void nor voidable per se because
some director self-dealing benefits the corporation as well as the in-
terested director.' Acknowledgment of an interested director's ability
to make decisions beneficial to the corporation arguably applies to ques-
tions of director termination of shareholder derivative suits. Although
an interested director improperly may urge dismissal based solely on his
self-interest, the director also may set forth valid business reasons, ir-
respective of his personal financial interests, to recommend
termination. 2 If the derivative suit actually would harm the corpora-
118 See note 54, supra. Because director termination of derivative suits brought against
directors presents many of the issues present in any conflict of interest situation, the
Maldonado-Del. court should not have distinguished between suits instituted against a
board majority and suits instituted against a board minority. See Steinberg, Unsafe Haven,
supra note 60, at 386 (inherent problems of structural bias remain whether shareholder im-
plicates minority or majority of board); Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 629 (naive
to contend that structural bias disappears when plaintiff accuses fewer directors of wrong-
doing). The Maldonado-Del. majority/minority distinction will encourage shareholders to
charge a majority of the board. See Coffee, supra note 95, at 279 (plaintiffs might charge all
board members to circumvent demand requirement). The distinction also will encourage
shareholders to institute suit before making a demand, because once the shareholders de-
mand that the directors bring an action against the wrongdoer, the business judgment rule
applies to the directors' refusal to act. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 784 n.10
(dictum). Moreover, if shareholders began two or more derivative suits as in the Zapata
series of cases, the directors' refusal to sue after demand in one case constitutes sufficient
grounds to find demand unnecessary in the remaining actions. See Nussbacher v. Continen-
tal Ill. Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
The Maldonado-Del. distinction encourages collusion between shareholders so directors will
have to meet the Maldonado-Del. strict standard of review in at least one derivative action.
See Demand and Standing, supra note 1, at 180-81.
M9 See Dent, supra note 1, at 121-22.
12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1974 rev.).
121 See Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 590 (1876) (holding loan from direc-
torlshareholder enforceable once creditor proved fairness of transaction to corporation). To
hold all self-dealing transactions void or even voidable per se would deprive a corporation of
aid from those most interested in the corporation's well-being. Id. at 589.
" Cf. note 54 supra (self-dealing director may provide valid reasons for dismissal of
derivative suit against himself). No one reasonably expects an interested director to recom-
mend pursuit of a claim against himself. See note 114 supra. Moreover, the director's in-
terest would reduce his desire to litigate fully. Id. A logical though self-serving director will
recommend dismissal regardless of the corporation's interests in going forward. See Dent,
supra note 1, at 139; cf. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (com-
mittee might have rationalized a "foreordained" decision to dismiss). Therefore, the court
should strictly review the interested director's rationale for recommending dismissal. See
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 788-89 (calling for strict court review even of
allegedly disinterested directors' dismissal reasons).
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tion," the court should allow any director, disinterested or otherwise, to
terminate the litigation.124 The Maldonado-Del. test, however, requires
the court to continue the litigation to the detriment of the corporation
and shareholders alike if interested directors move to dismiss.2 5
Unless states radically change corporate law applicable to
shareholder derivative suits,"6 individual states127 should apply the
standard of review developed in Maldonado-De1." to determine whether
to grant directors' motions to dismiss derivative suits brought against
directors. Derivative suits may constitute the most effective deterrent
to intracorporate abuses of managerial powers." Unfortunately, some
derivative suits merely may drain the corporation's resources."' Be-
tween these extreme classifications, courts should permit trial on the
merits only of those derivative suits which potentially will further the
corporation's interests."' Because the ultimate question does not hinge
solely on the merits of the underlying claim, but also depends on the ex-
pected net return of the litigation to the corporation,"' derivative suits
should not go to trial on the merits automatically if the court finds in-
terested directors demanding dismissal. Rather, the court should con-
sider the directors' good faith and thoroughness of investigation when
weighing the reasons put forth for dismissal."' Because the Maldonado-
Del. test already requires strict judicial scrutiny,"4 extension of the test
"' See note 130 infra (litigation detrimental if costs exceed benefits thereby gained).
"2 See Dent, supra note 1, at 123.
'" See 430 A.2d at 789 (trial must continue if court finds interest on part of petitioning
directors).
'" See Coffee, supra note 95, at 330-36 (recommending uniform change in state law to
preserve shareholder derivative suits). Assessing costs against plaintiff and denying at-
torney fees probably would reduce the incidence of litigation having a negative net return
to the corporation. Id.
" See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979) (state law determines whether direc-
tors may dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims); note 27 supra (law of state of corporate
domicile applies).
"' See 430 A.2d at 788-89; text accompanying notes 95-108 supra.
" See Coffee, supra note 95, at 302-09.
"' See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 786-87; text accompanying notes 112-13
supra. The "costs" to the corporation include more than the direct litigation costs. See
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (S.D. Tex. 1980). In Maker, the litigation
committee's assessment of costs of the derivative suit included the probable indemnification
of defendants, business time lost, possible loss of goodwill, impairment of management
abilities during trial, and the negative effect of a trial on employee morale. Id.
"' See Dent, supra note 1, at 123; Independent Directors, supra note 54, at 579, 583.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 788 (permitting motion to dismiss based
on corporation's best interests, not on underlying merits of claim).
' See Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Sante Fe; Rule 10b-5 and the New
Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263, 290 (1980) (crucial criterion should not be whether direc-
tor is financially interested, but whether he can exercise independent judgment); Director
Dismissal, supra note 24, at 537 (test is whether prudent, independent directors would
move for termination under like circumstances).
"u 430 A.2d at 788-89; see text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
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to instances of interested director dismissal should not unduly burden
the courts. Objective judicial scrutiny should satisfy minority
shareholders that their interests as shareholders would suffer if the
court allowed the action to proceed to trial on the merits.'35 The
Maldonado-Del. strict standard of review eliminates the danger posed by
structural bias by placing an affirmative duty on the directors to prove
the reasonableness of their motion to dismiss."6 In addition, the
Maldonado-Del. test, modified to allow interested directors to dismiss,
would allow directors, whether disinterested or not, to continue generally
unimpaired in managing the corporation's affairs."' The Maldonado-Del.
dismissal test, modified to allow interested directors to participate in
the investigation of shareholder allegations, ensures a thorough ad-
judication of the fundamental issue in every derivative action, whether
the corporation's expected benefits will exceed the costs of recovery,
without requiring a burdensome trial on the merits.
ALAN B. MUNRO
135 See Steinberg, supra note 54, at 25 (recommending strict judicial scrutiny to assure
impartiality as well as appearance of impartiality).
' See text accompanying notes 103-05 & 108 supra.
See Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (allegation that
time spent in litigating derivative suit detracted from time spent managing corporation).
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